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Abstract 
We examine subjects’ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from 
trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects’ beliefs, risk and 
other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in 
both roles, to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best response to the subject’s own 
behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that, when acting as senders, the 
majority of subjects adopt deceptive strategies by sending favorable message when the true state 
of the nature is unfavorable. When acting as receivers, the majority of subjects invest conditional 
upon receiving a favorable message. The investing behavior of receivers cannot be explained by 
risk preferences or as a best response to subject’s own behavior in the sender’s role. However, it 
can be rationalized by accounting for elicited beliefs and other-regarding preferences. Finally, 
the honest behavior of some senders can be explained by other-regarding preferences. Thus, we 
that find liars do believe, and that individuals who care about the payoffs of others tend to be 
honest. 
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1. Introduction 
“It is hard to believe that a man is telling the truth  
when you know that you would lie if you were in his place.” 
(H.L. Mencken) 
 
We depend upon financial analysts to determine when to buy or sell securities, upon 
attorneys’ assessments in deciding to pursue legal action, upon salespeople for product 
information, and upon doctors to undergo medical procedures. These experts hold private 
information that is not necessarily contractible or verifiable. Additionally, they have incentives to 
sway our behavior. Analysts receive commissions from transactions, attorneys from billed hours, 
salespeople from sales commissions, and doctors bill for procedures performed. While there are 
numerous examples of deception (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Franco et al., 2007), people 
have developed behaviors such as honesty and trust to facilitate the aforementioned interactions. 
A sender-receiver game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) is a prototype of an environment 
that captures many real-life interactions in which an informed agent (sender) has an incentive to 
misreport information to an uninformed agent (receiver) due to a possible conflict of interests. 
This type of environment has been well studied in the lab. Blume et al. (1998), Forysthe et al. 
(1999), Dickhaut et al. (2003) and Cai and Wang (2006), all find that, when there is some 
misalignment of interests, senders convey more information than theory predicts and receivers 
rely upon senders’ messages more than predicted. Similar behavior is documented in sender-
receiver games where there is never alignment of interests. Gneezy (2005), Sanchez-Pages and 
Vorsatz (2007) and Hurkens and Kartik (2009) argue that the two main reasons why senders 
convey more information than predicted are that subjects have other-regarding preferences for 
distributions and/or they are averse to lying.1 However, without a proper control for beliefs and 
elicitation of other-regarding preferences it is impossible to distinguish between these alternative 
explanations. 
We examine behavior in the sender-receiver game where there are gains to trade and 
alignment of subjects’ interests in one of the two states. Thus, our game models the setting where 
there are conflicts of interest, but still some potential for cooperation. In order to tease out the 
                                                 
1 Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) cite guilt aversion as explanation why senders (trustees in a trust game) reveal 
private information, where the trustee first sends a non-binding message, and then takes an action after observing the 
investment level. In our design, the sender can transmit a message, but only the receiver takes an action. 
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determinants of behavior we measure subjects’ beliefs about the behavior of others, risk and 
other-regarding preferences. By examining subjects’ beliefs of others, not only we can identify if 
senders intend to deceive others with messages sent, but can also identify whether receivers infer 
information content from senders’ messages. Furthermore, our design also allows us to examine 
the behavior of subjects in both roles to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best 
response to the subject’s own behavior in the other role. 
The results of the experiment indicate that, when acting as senders, the majority of 
subjects (60 percent) adopt deceptive strategies by sending favorable message when the true state 
of the nature is unfavorable. When acting as receivers, the majority of subjects (67 percent) 
invest conditional upon receiving a favorable message. The investing behavior of receivers 
cannot be explained by risk preferences or as a best response to the subject’s own behavior in the 
sender’s role. However, it can be rationalized by accounting for elicited beliefs about the 
behavior of others and other-regarding preferences. Despite the appeal of Mencken’s quoted 
prescription, we find that subjects believe that others are telling the truth, although these same 
subjects tend to lie. Rather than characterizing subjects who deceive yet believe (invest) “as if 
they believe they are the only once capable of dishonesty” (Forysthe et al., 1999 pp. 509), we 
find the majority of receivers believe there are enough honest senders to warrant investment. In 
aggregate the beliefs are not unfounded. Finally, the honest behavior of some senders can be 
explained by other-regarding preferences, while the other honest senders appear to be averse to 
lying. Thus, we find that liars do believe, and that individuals who care about the payoffs of 
others tend to be honest. 
 
2. Game, Experimental Design and Procedures 
2.1. Sender-Receiver Game 
The experimental design is based on a sender-receiver game. The game proceeds as 
follows. In the first stage, the sender receives a private perfect signal θ*∈{A,B} about the true 
state of nature. It is public knowledge that the state of the nature is likely to be favorable with 
probability p(A) and unfavorable with probability p(B). In the second stage, the sender releases a 
public message θ∈{A,B} regarding the state, after receiving a private signal θ*. After receiving 
the message θ, the receiver can invest his cash endowment η, in which case he receives 
π(θ*)∈{πA,πB}. The investment pays πB < η when θ* is B, and πA > η when θ* is A. If the receiver 
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decides not to invest he retains his endowment. The sender earns compensation λ > 0 if the 
receiver decides to invest, or else receives nothing. After the receiver makes his decision, the true 
state of nature θ* is revealed and both players receive their payoffs based on the state and 
depending on the investment decision of the receiver.  
Since it is always in sender’s interest to persuade receiver to invest, sender has an 
incentive to deceive a trusting receiver by sending message A when the true state of nature is B. 
Anticipating deception, the receiver ignores the message sent and invests only if p(A)πA + p(B)πB 
≥ η. Examining only pure strategies, it is trivial to prove truthful reporting cannot be sustained as 
an equilibrium. Alternatively, imagine the conditions needed for a mixed reporting strategy: the 
sender must be indifferent from reporting that the state is A or B. This dictates the receiver must 
have the same investing strategy for both messages received. Therefore, the equilibrium 
investment strategy is to always or never invest and the equilibrium reporting strategy is to 
destroy information content such that the receiver is indifferent between messages received. 
 
2.2. Experimental Parameters 
In the experiment, we set parameters such that a risk-neutral receiver should not invest. 
Specifically, we assume that the state of the nature is equally likely to be either favorable or 
unfavorable, i.e., p(A) = p(B) = 0.5. We also set the receiver’s endowment η = $10, the favorable 
state-based payoff πA = $18, the unfavorable state-based payoff πB = 0, and the sender’s 
compensation λ = $13. Given these parameters, the receiver’s expected payoff from investment, 
given that the sender’s message contains no information, is $9×(0.5×$18 + 0.5×$0). On the other 
hand, the receiver’s outside payment of not investing and keeping the endowment is $10. 
Therefore, the standard theoretical prediction would be not to invest.  
 
2.3. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University’s ESI laboratory. Subjects were 
recruited from a standard subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students. Subjects 
interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The computers were placed 
within individual cubicles in such a way that all subjects could only view their own computer 
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screen. The subjects acted both in the role of sender and receiver in a single one-shot interaction. 
We elicited the subjects’ decisions using the strategy method for both roles simultaneously. 
The five sessions each lasted approximately fifty-five minutes and consisted of 12 
subjects each. At the beginning of each section, an experimenter read the instructions aloud 
while each subject followed along with their own copy of the instructions. The instructions 
explained the experimental procedures, payoffs, and information structures used in the 
experiment (instruction available in the appendix). While going over the instructions, subjects 
were asked to write down their answers to several questions to ensure that they understood the 
instructions. Subjects’ answers remained confidential to other subjects. The experimenter 
reviewed the correct answers privately with each subject.2 During and after the instructions were 
read, subjects were prompted to ask the experimenter in private any questions regarding the 
experiment procedures.  
In the first part of the experiment, each subject simultaneously played both roles of 
sender and receiver, by choosing what message to send for each possible private signal and 
whether to invest for each possible sender’s message. That is, for both the favorable and 
unfavorable state, the sender made a binary choice to reveal the state truthfully or not. For each 
possible message, the receiver made a binary choice either not to invest (labeled ‘Stay’) or to 
invest (labeled ‘Go’). Consequently the subject was randomly and anonymously paired with two 
other subjects. The computer randomly selected the role for payment and the state of nature, and 
presented an outcome screen to each individual subject. However, the outcome screen was not 
presented until the very end of the experiment, after all parts of the experiment were completed. 
In the second part, all subjects were asked to predict what others elected to do. 
Specifically, we asked subjects to provide answers to the questions listed in Table 1. The 
elicitation of beliefs was incentivized, i.e., for each correct prediction subjects received US $5. 
Subjects were not aware of this task until after we elicited their choices from the first part. 
Subjects earned $5 for each correct prediction; however, subjects did not learn the outcome of 
this task until all parts of the experiment were completed. 
                                                 
2 Subjects on average answered less than one out of 13 questions incorrectly. 
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In the third part, we elicited subjects’ risk preferences from a set of 15 lotteries as in 
Table 2.3 In each lottery, subjects were asked to state whether they prefer a safe or risky option.4 
Parameters were set in such a way that a subject with risk-neutral preferences would select the 
first seven safe options. Subjects were not aware of this task until after we elicited their choices 
from the preceding two parts. One of the choices was randomly selected for payment at the very 
end of the experiment. 
Finally, in the fourth part, all subjects were asked to choose paired payoffs in a task 
designed to elicit attitudes towards others’ payoffs.5 Specifically, we elicit responses to four 
binary choices that affect the subject and another, as shown in Table 3.6 The first option is 
always a pair of equal payoffs to both the subject and another paired subject. The second option 
is always a pair of unequal payoffs. Although option 2 always results in unequal payoffs to the 
subject and another, in the first two choices the subject’s payoff is greater, and in the second two 
choices the subject’s payoff is lower than that of another paired subject. Subjects were not aware 
of this task until after we elicited their choices from the preceding step. After subjects made their 
decisions, subjects were randomly paired and one of the paired subjects’ choices was 
implemented. 
Before reporting the results, few comments concerning our design choices. First, our 
design of simultaneously eliciting a subject’s strategy as sender and receiver reflects a trade-off 
between the objectives of negating repeated-game/learning effects versus the possibility that 
subjects may be under the impression they are playing against themselves. We tried to minimize 
the later effects by explicitly telling subjects that they will be paired with other subjects and that 
the computer will randomly select the role and the state of nature for payment. Simultaneously 
eliciting subjects’ strategies may also lead subjects to make more strategic decisions and it may 
change expectations of others’ behavior. Finally, it is well recognized that the use of the strategy 
method may induce qualitative different behavior than the direct response method (for a 
                                                 
3 Experimental studies find risk preferences to be important in examining subjects’ behavior in lottery choices (Holt 
and Laury, 2002), auctions (Cox et al., 1988; Harrison, 1990), contests (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Sheremeta, 
2011), trust games (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) and coordination games (Heinemann et al., 2009). 
4 Rather than giving subjects to choose between two risky lotteries as in Holt and Laury (2002), we followed similar 
procedures to Sheremeta and Zhang (2010), Sheremeta (2011) and Balafoutas et al. (2012) by giving subjects a 
choice between a safe and a risky option. 
5 A number of experimental studies show that some subjects care about the payoffs of others (Charness and Rabin, 
2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). 
6 The choices of distributions mirror those used by Bartling et al. (2009) and Balafoutas et al. (2012). 
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discussion of these issues see Brandts and Charness, 2011). Although all of the above are 
legitimate concerns, we find that the rates of deception and investment in our experiment are 
comparable to those in Gneezy (2005) and Hurkens and Kartik (2009). 
In designing our experiment, we intentionally chose to elicit beliefs after electing 
strategies, but before revealing outcomes. Subjects were not aware beforehand that belief 
elicitation would occur after the actual game. This sequence was used in order to minimize the 
possibility of strategic hedging behavior that may arise when eliciting behavior and beliefs 
simultaneously.7 Lastly, in our experiment we did not communicate results of any choices or 
resulting payoffs until the final payment stage in order to minimize any wealth or hedging 
effects.8 However, since there is the opportunity to use hedging strategies, the design did have a 
risk of not finding beliefs consistent with behavior. 
At the end of the experiment, each subject was paid a $7 participation fee, the payoffs 
from the scenario, their predictions, one gamble, and one distribution choice. Each participant 
individually signed and dated a payment receipt form and received payment. On average subjects 
earned $24 in addition to their participation fee.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Description of Choices 
We found no significant differences between the five sessions and thus report the 
combined results. In the role of sender 40 percent of subjects (24 of 60) choose to always reveal 
their private information regarding the state. As reported in top line of Table 4, in the role of 
sender, all but one subject send the message A when the state is A, and 60 percent of subjects (36 
of 60) send the message A when the state is B. We find a majority of subjects invest when the 
message is A, but not when the message is B. In the role of receiver, 67 percent of subjects (40 of 
60) choose to invest when the message is A, and only 15 percent of subjects (6 of 60) when the 
message is B. 
We classify behavior jointly and show the results in Figure 1. Subjects are classified as 
honest if, in the role of sender, they always reveal the true state and as deceptive if they 
                                                 
7 Offerman et al. (1996) and Blanco et al. (2010) argue that hedging confounds do not appear problematic when 
hedging opportunities are not prominent 
8 Of course, in the risk elicitation task subjects could guarantee themselves a payoff of $1 by always choosing a safe 
option. However, we believe that these are small wealth effects to trigger any substantial deviations in subjects’ 
behavior. 
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misreport the true state.9  Similarly, in the role of receiver, subjects are classified as either 
choosing to invest or not (conditional upon the message). Examining the investment choices in 
Figure 1a, when the message is A, we find the largest proportions are honest/invest and 
deceptive/invest, accounting for approximately two-thirds of subjects. Especially interesting is 
the fact that 43 percent of subjects’ choices as a receiver (26 of 60) is not the best response to 
their own behavior as a sender. 10  Examining investment choices in Figure 1b we find the 
overwhelming majority elects to not invest when the message is B, consistent with the inference 
of information content in the senders’ messages. These results confirm earlier findings of 
Forsythe et al. (1999), who find a correlation between dishonesty and gullibility. Forsythe et al. 
posit that for lying to be profitable, a sender must believe that the others are dupable. Based on 
elicited beliefs, we examine this conjecture in the next section. 
 
3.2. Description of Beliefs 
Analyzing subjects’ beliefs about others’ behavior we find that beliefs are heterogeneous 
across subjects. In addition, subjects believe that others will act heterogeneously. The histograms 
shown in Figure 2 display the elicited beliefs (questions listed in Table 1). Most subjects believe 
that most senders will explicitly reveal the true state when the state is favorable (Figure 2a), 
while a simple majority believe most senders will send a deceptive message when the state is 
unfavorable (Figure 2b). As such, subjects believe that there is information content in messages. 
The majority of subjects also believe that receivers are likely to invest upon seeing a message 
suggesting a favorable state (Figure 2c), and the overwhelming majority of subjects believe that 
receivers are not likely to invest upon seeing an unfavorable message (Figure 2d). Consequently, 
subjects believe that others are dupable. 
While subjects have different beliefs about the behavior of others, the average beliefs are 
surprisingly close to the observed behavior as shown in Table 4. Examining the distribution of 
                                                 
9 Only one subject used an invertible reporting strategy, sending the message B when the state was A, and sending 
the message A when the state was B. While this reporting strategy has the same expected value as telling the truth 
when using the strategy method, we find that the ratio of always telling the truth to always lying is 24 to 1. A 
majority of subjects elect to report that the state was favorable. 
10 This observation is confirmed by statistical analysis using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test. The null 
hypothesis that behavior is consistent over roles is rejected at a 0.01 significance level. 
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errors for each subject we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean error is zero.11 On average, 
however, subjects somewhat underestimate the likelihood that the sender would send a favorable 
message when both the state is favorable and unfavorable. Subjects are more accurate in respect 
to receivers’ behavior, believing that on average the majority of receivers will invest given the 
favorable message, but not invest given the unfavorable message. 
 
3.3. Description of Risk and Other-Regarding Preferences 
Next, we report the responses to the safe versus risky gamble shown in Table 2. The vast 
majority of subjects initially choose the safe gamble (option 1) and switch to the risky gamble 
(option 2) once the probability of the high payoff is larger. Figure 3 displays the number of 
subjects choosing 0-15 safe options. The majority of subjects also show a tendency toward risk-
averse behavior. The mean number of safe choices is 9.2 (median 9.5), while risk-neutral 
behavior corresponds to only 7 safe choices. A histogram of the responses in Figure 3 shows that 
most subjects choose one or more, but not all, risky choices. Four subjects never take a risky 
gamble and one always chooses the risky gamble. 
Finally, we report the responses to the distributional choices shown in Table 3. We 
classify subjects as ahead-averse, behind-averse and pro-social. Subjects with sufficiently 
negative utility from receiving more than others (choosing option 1 for choice #2) are classified 
as ahead-averse, and subjects with sufficiently negative utility from receiving less than others 
(choosing option 1 for choice #4) are classified as behind-averse. Subjects choosing to increase 
other’s wealth, if it does not affect their own wealth, are classified as pro-social. That is, pro-
social subjects maximize others’ wealth if economically indifferent between two options 
(choosing option 1 for choice #1 and option 2 for choice #3). 
We find 5 percent of subjects (3 of 60) have no measurable other-regarding preferences 
using our classification. 28 percent (17 of 60) are ahead-averse, 30 percent (18 of 60) are behind-
averse, and 7 percent (4 of 60) are both ahead- and behind-averse. Nearly half of subjects (29 of 
60) are neither ahead-averse nor behind-averse, but over half (39 of 60) are pro-social. Only one 
subject reveals strictly utilitarian preferences and selects option 1 for all distributional choices. 
These classifications are shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, 22 percent of subjects (13 of 60) are 
                                                 
11 We construct an error for each individual subject, examining the difference between a subject’s beliefs of others 
and the behavior of all other subjects. Shapiro-Wilk W tests reject these differences are normally distributed, 
therefore, we use Wilcoxon tests and fail to reject the null that the mean error is zero. 
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ahead-averse but not behind-averse, which is contrary to the standard assumptions about 
inequality-averse preferences discussed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
 
3.4. Determinants of Behavior  
Next we look at the determinants of subjects’ behavior. We conjecture that the non-
equilibrium behavior of receivers can be explained by their beliefs about the behavior of others’. 
Nearly half of subjects believe that the majority of senders will report A when the state is B, but 
almost all believe the majority of senders will report A when the state is A. Using the subject’s 
elicited beliefs of senders’ behavior, we construct the expected value of investing given the 
message is A. For the 67 percent of subjects (40 of 60) who invest when the message is A, more 
than half (21 of 40) have greater expected value when investing than not investing. So in 
addition to the 33 percent of subjects (20 of 60) who do not invest, another 35 percent (21 of 60) 
play a best response to their own beliefs of senders’ behavior, yielding 68 percent (41 of 60) who 
appear acting strategically.12 Without considering risk or other-regarding preferences, we find 
that the majority of receivers’ maximize their expected payoff in light of their beliefs. This 
interpretation is supported by further statistical analysis. 
We construct a probit regression using the subject’s elicited beliefs, risk preferences and 
other-regarding preferences. The belief about the number of others who report A when seeing the 
state is A is labeled ‘Beliefs sender A’ while the belief about the number of others who report A 
when seeing the state is B is labeled ‘Beliefs sender B’. We classify subjects as risk-averse if 
they choose eight or more safe choices. Pro-social, ahead or behind aversion are also coded as 
binary variables. The estimation results are shown in Table 5. Examining the choice to invest 
when the message is A, we find that beliefs about the behavior of other senders are significant at 
a 0.001 level (see Table 5).13 The more receivers believe that senders are honest about the true 
state being A the higher is the probability of investment. At the same time those who are 
classified as behind-averse or pro-social are less likely to invest. Specifically, when examining 
subjects’ behavior when the sender’s message is A/B, we find 78/28 percent of subjects classified 
                                                 
12 We have only 9 observations of subjects investing in the role of receiver when the message is B. 6 of these 9 
subjects tell the truth in the role of sender and 3 always sent message A. 8 of the 9 also invested for A. 
Unfortunately, the low number of observations does not allow us to make any further conclusions. 
13 We cannot perform reliable statistical analysis on the receivers’ behavior when the state is B because there are 
only 15 percent of subjects (9 of 60) who invest conditional on seeing message B. 
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as behind-averse and 62/10 percent not behind-averse choose to invest, and 59/5 percent of 
subjects classified as pro-social and 81/33 percent not pro-social choose to invest. 
As reported in Table 5 neither risk nor ahead-averse preferences have any significant 
predictive power about the behavior of receivers.14  In particular, when examining subjects’ 
behavior when the sender’s message is A/B, we find 66/15 percent of subjects classified as risk-
averse and 69/15 percent of subjects classified as risk-seeking choose to invest and 82/12 percent 
of subjects classified as ahead-averse and 61/16 percent not ahead-averse choose to invest.  
Next we look at what factors can explain the behavior of subjects in the role of a sender. 
From belief elicitation, we find that the majority of subjects believe that only a few will invest 
when seeing the message B and most will invest when seeing the message A. Such beliefs should 
create a bias for releasing the message A, even when the state is B. The observed behavior is 
consistent with these beliefs. All but one subject report message A when the state is A, and 60 
percent of subjects (36 of 60) report A when the state is B. As such we cannot perform statistical 
analysis on the senders’ behavior when the state is A. For those 40 percent of subjects (24 of 60) 
who honestly report B, 96 percent (23 of 24) believe that receivers are more likely to invest when 
the message is A than when the message is B. The question is then, why do senders who see state 
B do not profitably deceive by sending the message A?  
Two potential explanations why subjects report B is that subjects have other-regarding 
preferences, i.e., they care not only about own payoff but also about the payoff of others 
(Hurkens and Kartik, 2009), or that subjects are averse to lying and/or guilt (Gneezy, 2005; 
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz, 2007). Our data allows us to 
separate the two explanations of (i) payoff preferences and  (ii) lying and/or guilt aversion.15 
                                                 
14  As a robustness test, we ran the probit regressions shown in Table 5 using alternative measures of risk 
preferences. First, we used higher cutoff values of the safe choices elicited to classify risk-averse versus risk-seeking 
subjects. Second, instead of using a binary measure of risk aversion we used a scaled inverse tangent function. The 
results of these alternative estimations are very similar (both qualitatively and quantitatively) to the results reported, 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
15 An alternative hypothesis to lying-aversion is guilt-aversion. If guilt-aversion is a determinant of honesty in our 
experiment then senders’ beliefs of receivers strategies may differ between those who are honest versus those who 
are deceptive: if guilt-aversion drives honest reporting then guilt can only be experienced if senders believe others 
will listen. Examining the beliefs of subjects, and discarding those who believe no one will invest for either message 
A or B, we find that 31 of 35 subjects who report deceptively believe investment will be greater when message A is 
reported. For those subjects who report honestly, 22 of 23 believe investment will be greater when message A is 
reported. Using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test we find no differences in beliefs between honest and deceptive senders 
(p-value = 0.47). Fisher’s exact test and the Student’s t-test also yield non-significant results. Thus, we find no 
evidence supporting lying-aversion over guilt-aversion, or visa-versa. In our experiment it appears guilt- and lying-
aversion are indistinguishable. 
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As we discussed previously, 5 percent of subjects (3 of 60) reveal no measurable other-
regarding preferences, 23 percent of subjects (17 of 60) are ahead-averse, 18 percent of subjects 
are behind-averse, and 7 percent of subjects (4 of 60) are both ahead- and behind-averse (Figure 
4). Recall that 24 subjects choose to be honest by reporting B when the state is B, while they 
believed that it would be more profitable to lie and report A. Together with elicited beliefs and 
other-regarding preferences, our data indicate that almost 70 percent of the ahead-averse subjects 
(11 of 16) choose to be honest by reporting B when the state is B compared to only 30 percent of 
subjects (13 of 43) who are not ahead-averse. This suggests that 46 percent of truthful senders 
(11 of 24) are guided by other-regarding preferences, confirming the conjecture of Gneezy 
(2005) that the decision to lie depends on how much it will reduce the payoff of other subjects. 
However, nearly an identical number of senders (13 of 24) elected to be honest despite not being 
ahead-averse, confirming the conjecture of Hurkens and Kartik (2009) that some subjects are 
simply averse to lying or are guilt averse.16 
Table 6 reports the statistical analysis consistent with these observations. A probit 
regression of the sender’s choice when the state is B includes the subject’s beliefs of others’ 
behavior in the role of receiver, risk preferences and other-regarding preferences. Consistent with 
earlier observation, only ahead aversion is significant at a five percent level. Note that neither 
risk preferences nor beliefs have any significant predictive power about the behavior of senders 
when seeing the state is B.17 
 
4. Conclusion 
We examine subjects’ behavior in scenarios where senders have valuable private 
information but due to conflicts of interests, might elect to deceive receivers. Like other studies 
we find that many senders are deceptive (60 percent), while others are honest (40 percent). Using 
belief elicitation procedures, we find that senders choose to be honest disregarding the fact that 
they have correct beliefs that lying would be more profitable. Combined with elicited other-
regarding preferences, our data indicate that 46 percent of honest senders are guided by other-
regarding preferences of ahead-averseness, while 54 percent appear simply averse to lying. Thus, 
                                                 
16 Kartik et al. (2007) model the sender-receiver game where senders have preferences for truth-telling. Our work 
confirms that some senders opt to tell the truth despite believing others are dupable. 
17 Examining individual data of senders when the state is B, we do not find any consistent predictive patterns 
regarding beliefs and risk preferences. 
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our results are consistent both with Gneezy’s (2005) conjecture that the decision to lie depends 
on how much it will reduce the payoff of other subjects and with Hurkens and Kartik’s (2009) 
conjecture that some subjects are simply averse to lying. 
Motivated in part by Forysthe et al. (1999), we examine the behavior of subjects in both 
roles, to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best response to the subject’s own 
behavior in the other role. We find that subjects believe that others are telling the truth, although 
these same subjects often tend to lie. Moreover, most subjects act in accordance with their beliefs 
of others, and, on average, these beliefs are correct and mirror actual behavior. Thus, rather than 
characterizing subjects as dupable, or as humorously described in Forysthe et al. as “…half a 
sucker born every minute” (p. 509), we argue that these apparently dupable subjects play a best 
response to their belief that there are enough honest senders to warrant investment. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Elicitation of Beliefs. 
 
Number Question 
#1 How many senders sent message A when the state was A?  
#2 How many senders sent message A when the state was B?  
#3 How many receivers invested when the message was A?  
#4 How many receivers invested when the message was B?  
Subjects were asked to guess the number of subjects in their session. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Elicitation of Risk Preferences. 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 
Choice Safe Option Risky Option 
# 1 $1 0/20 of $3 20/20 of $0 
# 2 $1 1/20 of $3 19/20 of $0 
# 3 $1 2/20 of $3 18/20 of $0 
# 4 $1 3/20 of $3 17/20 of $0 
# 5 $1 4/20 of $3 16/20 of $0 
# 6 $1 5/20 of $3 15/20 of $0 
# 7 $1 6/20 of $3 14/20 of $0 
# 8 $1 7/20 of $3 13/20 of $0 
# 9 $1 8/20 of $3 12/20 of $0 
# 10 $1 9/20 of $3 11/20 of $0 
# 11 $1 10/20 of $3 10/20 of $0 
# 12 $1 11/20 of $3 9/20 of $0 
# 13 $1 12/20 of $3 8/20 of $0 
# 14 $1 13/20 of $3 7/20 of $0 
# 15 $1 14/20 of $3 6/20 of $0 
Subjects choose between a safe option 1 ($1 for sure) or a risky 
option 2 (a chance of receiving either $3 or $0). Choosing the 
risky option for the first seven choices is consistent with risk 
neutrality. Subjects who choose the risky option for choices 
greater than #7 risk-averse were classified as risk-averse. 
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Table 3: Elicitation of Other-Regarding Preferences. 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 
Choice Self, Other Self, Other 
#1 $2, $2 $2, $1 
#2 $2, $2 $3, $1 
#3 $2, $2 $2, $4 
#4 $2, $2 $3, $5 
Subjects choose between option 1 (equal payoffs) or 
option 2 (unequal payoffs). Subject who choose option 1 
for choice #2 were classified as ahead-averse, option 1 for 
choice #4 behind-averse, and both option 1 for choice #1 
and option 2 for #3 pro-social.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Average Beliefs and Behavior. 
 
 Reveal Signal Invest If 
 If Seeing State: Sender’s Message: 
 A B A B 
Actual Behavior 98.3* 40.0 66.7* 15.0* 
Average Beliefs 91.4 34.5 69.2 17.6 
Percentages reported. 
* Significantly different from 0.5 at 0.01 level using two-tailed 
binomial test. 
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Table 5: Probability of Investment when Seeing Message A. 
 
 Estimate Standard Error P-value 
Beliefs sender A 0.076 0.018 0.001 
Beliefs sender B -0.028 0.021 0.174 
Risk-averse -0.125 0.111 0.323 
Ahead-averse 0.185 0.092 0.083 
Behind-averse -0.993 0.006 0.001 
Pro-social -0.897 0.052 0.001 
Robust probit regression reports marginal effects of estimate. 
60 observations, probability > Wald Chi2 = 0.001, Pseudo R2 = 0.341. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Probability of Sending Message B when Seeing State is B. 
 
 Estimate Standard Error P-value 
Beliefs receiver A -0.010 0.023 0.680 
Beliefs receiver B 0.021 0.029 0.467 
Risk-averse -0.190 0.178 0.284 
Ahead-averse 0.457 0.146 0.006 
Behind-averse 0.214 0.288 0.459 
Pro-social -0.193 0.288 0.507 
Robust probit regression reports marginal effects of estimate.  
60 observations, probability > Wald Chi2 = 0.025, Pseudo R2 = 0.189. 
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(a) Conditional on the Message A 
  
(b) Conditional on the Message B 
 
Figure 1: Percent of Subjects Grouped by Joint Choices Conditional on the Message. 
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(a) Other Subjects Send Message A  
when Seeing State is A 
  
(b) Other Subjects Send Message A  
when Seeing State is B 
  
(c) Other Subjects Invest  
when Seeing Message A 
  
(d) Other Subjects Invest  
when Seeing Message B 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of Subjects’ Elicited Beliefs of Others' Behavior. 
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Figure 3: Percent of Subjects Choosing 0-15 Safe Options. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4: Percent of Subjects Grouped by Attitudes towards Others’ Payoffs. 
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Appendix (Not for Publication): Experiment Instructions 
 
This is a computerized experiment in the economics of decision-making. By following the instructions carefully and 
making good decisions, you may earn an additional amount of money besides the show up bonus of $7. The 
currency used in this experiment is US dollars. The actual amount of additional money that you may earn will 
depend on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. Your money will be paid to you in cash after the 
experiment ends.  
 
There are some rules you must follow:  
1. Do not talk to others at any time during the experiment.  
2. You will use your computer to select decisions during the experiment. Do not use your mouse or keyboard to play 
around with the software running on your computer. If you unintentionally or intentionally close the software 
program running on your computer, you will be asked to leave. If this happens, you will receive only your show up 
bonus.  
3. If you have any questions during the experiment or instructions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will 
come to your location and answer your questions.  
 
Details of the Experiment 
Grouping of Participants 
The experiment consists of a single round. Within this round you will be randomly paired with two other 
participants, but into two separate settings and thus with two separate participants. Within each setting there will be 
a single Sender and a single Receiver. You will make decisions as a Sender in one of the settings, and as a Receiver 
in the other setting. These settings are separate, as your decisions in one setting will not affect the other setting.  
 
You will never be told whom you are paired with. You are not allowed to communicate with others during the 
experiment. 
 
Overview of the Setting 
All payoffs and values will be expressed in the monetary unit lira during instructions and experiment. At the end of 
the experiment we will convert lira to US dollars and pay you in cash. 
 
Each Receiver has one unit of the financial asset. At the end of each round, the computer determines the State of the 
economy, which in turn dictates the lira value of each Receiver’s asset. The chances of a particular State are: 
 
Chances of States 
State A B 
Chance of State 1/2 1/2 
 
The State will be either A or B. There is an equal chance that the computer will select A or B. So, on average the 
computer will select A 50 percent of the time and B 50 percent of the time. 
 
At the beginning of each round the Sender privately learns the State. No one else learns the State before the end of 
the round. 
 
After the Sender learns the State, the Sender sends a Report to the Receiver. After the Receiver sees the Sender’s 
Report, the Receiver decides to Go or Stay resulting in the following lira payoffs.  
 
Payoffs Given State and Receiver’s Decisions 
State A B 
Receiver decides to Go   
Receiver 18 0 
Sender 13 13 
Receiver decides to Stay   
Receiver 10 10 
Sender 0 0 
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Notice that only when the State is A are the payoffs higher for all parties when the Receiver decides to Go rather 
than to Stay. Also notice that the payoff is higher for the Sender if the Receiver decides to Go rather then to Stay in 
both States A and B. Last, notice that the payoffs do not depend on the Sender’s Report, only on the State and 
whether the Receiver decides to Go or Stay. 
 
What is the Sender’s Report? If the Sender learns the State is A, the Sender can decide to report either A or B. If the 
Sender learns the State is B, the Sender can decide to Report A or B.  
 
Questionnaire 1 
Below, please write down your answers to the following questions. If you have a question please raise your hand 
and an experimenter will privately answer your question. In a few minutes, an experimenter will review the correct 
answers.  
1. What is the chance the State will be B? (0,1/2,1)  
2. If the Sender knows the State is B, what can she report? (A,B,A or B)  
3. If the Receiver knew the State was A, could he personally benefit from deciding to Go? (Yes,No)  
4. If the Receiver knew the State was B, could he personally benefit from deciding to Go? (Yes,No)  
5. If the Receiver decides to Go, what will the Sender receive? ($10,$13)  
 
Sender’s Decision 
We will ask you to make a decision in the role of Sender in one setting. Specifically, we will ask you to make a 
decision about what you would report to the paired Receiver in advance of seeing the State drawn. In the role of 
Sender, you will see the following on your screen: 
 
Screenshot provided to subjects at this point. 
 
On the left side of the screen you are asked as a Sender to fill in the two entries: (i) if the State were equal to A, 
would you report A or B, and (ii) if the State were equal to B, would you report A or B? Specifically, for each 
possible State, you need to tell the computer what Report you will send.  
 
We want you, as the Sender, to say in advance what you would do in both of the scenarios. The computer 
implements the decisions you make once the State is drawn. Your decision will not affect which State is drawn. 
Your decision in the role of Sender will not effect the outcome of the setting in which you are a Receiver. 
 
Receiver’s Decision 
We will ask you to make a decision in the role of Receiver in the other setting. Specifically, we will ask you to make 
a decision about what you would do for each possible Report the paired Sender might send before you see the 
Report. In the role of Receiver, you will see the following on your screen: 
 
Screenshot provided to subjects at this point. 
 
On the right side of the screen you are asked as a Receiver to fill in the two entries: if (i) the Sender’s Report were 
A, do you want to Go or Stay, and (ii) if the Sender’s Report were B, do you want to Go or Stay? Although, in the 
end as a Receiver you would see only one Report (A or B), we still want you to tell us what you would do for each 
possible Report.  
 
Your decision will not affect which Report is sent or which State drawn. Your decision in the role of Receiver will 
not effect the outcome of the setting in which you are a Sender. 
 
Questionnaire 2 
Below, please write down your answers to the following questions. In a few minutes, an experimenter will review 
the correct answers.  
1. If the Sender elects to report A always, what report will the Receiver see when the State is A? (A,B)  
2. If the Sender elects to report A always, what report will the Receiver see when the State is B? (A,B)  
3. Does the Receiver always have to Go? (Yes/No)  
4. If the Sender’s Report is B, can the State be A? (Yes/No)  
5. If the Sender’s Report is A, can the State be B? (Yes/No)  
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Results of the Round 
After you make both your decisions, the decision in the role of Sender and the decision in the role of Receiver, click 
on the red ‘Submit’ button. After all participants input their decisions, the computer will display the outcome screen 
with the outcome from one of the two settings. One of your settings will be randomly selected and you will be paid 
on the outcome of that setting. For example, if the setting in which you played the role of Receiver was selected for 
payment, then your screen would show:  
 
Results of the Round 
State  
Sender’s report  
Receiver’s decision  
Sender’s payoff  
Receiver’s payoff  
 
How is this table generated? After all the participants have input their decisions, the computer will draw realizations 
of the State independently for each pair. The computer determines the State randomly as based on Chances of State 
table. Given the decision input by the Sender, the Report is determined and appears under the caption ‘Sender’s 
Report’. Note this is the Sender’s Report–not the State.  
 
Next, using the decision input by the Receiver, the computer reports if the Receiver decided to Stay or Go for the 
given Sender’s Report. This decision is reported in the row titled ‘Receiver’s decision’. Finally, the computer 
determines the payoffs (taken from Payoffs Given State and Receiver’s Decisions table) given the State and the 
decisions for the Sender and the Receiver. These payoffs are reported in the last two rows titled ‘Sender’s payoff’ 
and ‘Receiver’s payoff’. 
 
To summarize, the experiment consists of a single round where:  
• Grouping of Participants: pairs are randomly assigned.  
• Participant’s Decisions: each participant enters both a decision in the role of Sender and a decision in the role of 
Receiver.  
• Payoffs: the computer randomly selects one setting calculates payoffs using the decisions input.  
• Results for the round: each participant sees payoff from the setting where he/she was the Sender or from the setting 
where he/she was the Receiver.  
 
Questionnaire 3 
Below, please write down your answers to the following questions. In a few minutes, an experimenter will review 
the correct answers  
1. You will be paid for one of your settings, not both. (True/False)  
2. If the State is A, the Sender reports ‘A’ when the State is A, and the Receiver decides to Go when the Report is 
‘A’, what is: 
a. The Sender’s Report? (A,B) 
b. The Receiver’s payoff? (0,10,18) 
c. The Sender’s payoff? (0,13)  
3. If the State is B, the Sender reports ‘A’ when the State is B, and Receiver decides to Stay when the Report is ‘A’, 
what is: 
a. The Sender’s Report? (A,B) 
b. The Receiver’s payoff? (0,10,18) 
c. The Sender’s payoff? (0,13)  
 
The following portion was distributed after the aforementioned communication game decisions elicited.  
 
Predict What Other Participants Decided 
Before we report the results of your and other participants’ decisions, we want you to tell us what you think others 
did. 
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Every participant had to make decisions in the role of sender and in the role of receiver. We want you to predict 
what others did. So, we ask you to answer four questions:  
1. How many participants decided to send the report ‘A’ when the state was indeed A?  
2. How many participants decided to send the report ‘A’ when the state was indeed B?  
3. How many participants decided to Go when they saw a report of A?  
4. How many participants decided to Go when they saw a report of B?  
 
Since there are 12 participants here today, we want you to predict how many of the 12 participants answered as 
stated. Please enter a number no greater than 12 to each one of the questions above, including yourself (your input 
decision are shown). You will be paid $5 for every correct prediction.  
 
The following portion was distributed after the aforementioned communication game decisions and beliefs elicited.  
 
15 Decision Problems 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in 15 decision problems. How much you 
receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not designed to 
test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really 
would choose. 
 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 15 
lines in the table but only one line will be randomly selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be selected, 
and you do not know which line will be selected when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to 
the choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices the computer will randomly drawn a 
number from 1 to 15. The drawn number determines which line is going to be selected for payment. 
 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, you will 
receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings another 
number is randomly drawn from 1 to 20. The drawn number is then compared with the numbers in the line selected 
(see the table). If the drawn number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the drawn number shows up in the 
right column you earn $0. 
 
While you have all the information in the table, we ask you that you input all your 15 choices into the computer. The 
actual earnings for this part will be determined at the end, and will be independent of the prior portions.  
 
Deci
sion 
no. 
Opti
on A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3 never $0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
2 $1 $3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage $0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
3 $1 $3 if 1 or 2 $0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
4 $1 $3 if 1,2,3 $0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
5 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4, $0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
6 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5 $0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
7 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6 $0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
8 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
9 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
10 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
11 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 $0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 $0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
 
The following portion was distributed after the aforementioned communication game decisions, beliefs, and risk 
attitudes elicited.  
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4 Decision Problems 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in 4 decision problems. For each line in 
the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 4 lines in the table but 
just one line will be randomly selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay 
equal attention to the choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices the computer will 
randomly drawn a number from 1 to 4. The drawn number determines which line is going to be selected for 
payment. 
 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: if you chose option A in that line, you will 
receive $2 and the other participant who will be matched with you will also receive $2. If you chose option B in that 
line, you and the other participant will receive earnings as indicated in the table for that specific line. For example, if 
you chose B in line 2 and this line is selected for payment, you will receive $3 and the other participant will receive 
$1. Similarly, if you chose B in line 3 and this line is selected for payment, you will receive $2 and the other 
participant will receive $4. 
 
After you have completed all your choices the computer will randomly determine which line is going to be paid. 
Then the computer will randomly and anonymously match you with another participant in the experiment. While 
matching you with another participant, the computer will also randomly determine whose decision to implement. If 
the computer chooses your decision to implement, then the earnings to you and the other participant will be 
determined according to your choice of A or B. If the computer chooses the other participant decision to implement, 
then the earnings will determined according to the other participant choice of A or B. 
 
While you have all the information in the table, we ask you that you input all your 4 choices into the computer. The 
actual earnings for this part will be determined at the end, and will be independent of the prior portions.  
 
 Distribution A Distribution B 
 (you, the other participant) (you, the other participant) 
1 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $2 to you, $1 to other participant 
2 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $3 to you, $1 to other participant 
3 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $2 to you, $4 to other participant 
4 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $3 to you, $5 to other participant 
  
